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Objective:   
 The goal of this study is to provide a case-study on the Metro Transportes do Sul (MTS) Concession trough 
an analysis of the risk sharing and financial compensations. Over the last 20 years, Portugal has been 
experiencing a large wave of PPP contracts. Concessions experiencing unbalance risk allocation is a 
constant problem in important projects and the MTS concession has been the most recent example of it. 
Renegotiation Agreement, calculation of compensations, traffic forecasts, no connection among bodies and 
unbalanced risk allocation are some of the reasons for a detailed analysis of this concession project  
Methodology:   
 This paper is divided in two categories: First, a description of the concession contract, the delays in the 
MTS concession and the renegotiation process; Secondly, an analysis of the financial compensation from 
the Government and the Risk Allocation situation.  
Findings:  
 This paper concludes that due to the inaccurate traffic forecast and the lack of coordination among the 
different bodies in the concession project there is a strong imbalance in the current risk allocation the 
Government was bound to be the largest contributor of the MTS concession trough financial compensations 
to the concessionaire  
Recommendation:   
 The recommendations to this concession project are ground on the idea of a better management of the 
concession in general, avoiding Demand risk ex-ante, providing better technical condition for monitoring 
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1.  Introduction  
  The Public and Private Partnerships idea is not new one. We would have to come back to the 
seventeenth century to experience the beginning of this famous arrangement, when France 
launched their first concession models. Yet, this private financing through PPPs, with the goal of 
procuring and maintaining public-sector infrastructures saw its popularity increased over the last 
decade. Structuring Public and Private Partnerships is not an easy task and most of the times 
rather complex. There is the need to bring together and reconcile the objectives of a large stake of 
participants such as investors, companies providing the service and lenders in the private sector to 
public authorities and the public in general on the public side (Yescombe, 2007).  
  Presenting it as a definition, PPPs concept can be defined as different ways of co-operation 
between authorities in the public sphere and the business world to provide the financing, 
management, construction and others, of some infrastructure as a provision of a service (European 
Commission 2004). Nevertheless, what makes it interesting for the Government or any other public 
authority to engage in such a time-consuming and complex arrangement is not the partnership by 
itself but the opportunity to achieve Value for money. VfM refers to providing an infrastructure 
asset and any other related service in the process at a lower cost than the conventional public 
procurement, yet, taking into consideration that quality standards are being met in accordance with 
the contract specifications (Nick Sciulli, 2007)  
  When considering Public and Private Partnerships, the concessionaire will normally take as 
responsibilities the building and maintenance as well as the managing of the infrastructure. A 
contract with a single firm that brings together both the building and operation may take the form 
of a DBFO (Design, Build, Finance and Operate), BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) or a BOO 
(Build, Own and Operate). PPPs are used across Europe, US and a several other developing 
countries for the arrangement of infrastructures and services of public domain in sector such as 
energy, transports, waste management, prisons, IT, hospitals, schools and others. Typically, in rail, 
port and road projects the private party recovers its initial investment through charges to the 
customers whereas in Hospital and Schools, where the customer does not pay, it is the public sector 




 The first large PPP project in Portugal was the bridge over Tagus River. PPP concessions were 
also used in health, railway, water distribution to mention just few, over the last 25 years. With the 
entrance in the European Union, Portugal experienced a large wave of PPP concessions with the 
launch of 11 road projects in the transportation sector. The Portuguese Government ended up going 
too far in launching these concessions, in such a short amount of years (Cruz and Marques, 2010). 
After the financial crisis, a new fiscal reform was agreed between the Portuguese State and the 
European Bodies where new PPP projects were suspended, awaiting a review of the existing PPPs 
and the implementation of several legal and institutional reforms. This processes had the aim of 
improving the management and assessment of PPPs fiscal risk lacking in Portugal concessions, 
(European PPP Expertise Centre, 2014).   
  The MTS concession signed in 2002 is part of a great number of onerous deals made by the 
Portuguese Government. The problems related with demand risk makes it interesting since one can 
extend the conclusions already achieved for Fertagus concession which presented similar issues. 
The fact that the concession takes place between not only the Portuguese Government and MTS 
concessionaire but also between the municipalities of Almada, Seixal and Moita, gives further 
insight on the ability of the Government to coordinate multiple contract relations, particularly 
during the Financial Rebalancing Agreement of 2008.  
  The present paper is a case-study on the evolution and delays of the MTS construction and 
subsequent operation, with special focus on the 2008 FRA. A breakdown on the several financial 
compensations and additional costs due to these same delays will be presented, in order to better 
understand the magnitude of this project failure and the impact it had on the initial investment by 
the Portuguese Government.  
  This study starts by giving a general picture with regard to PPP renegotiations and risk allocation, 
with special focus on the MTS concession. The Case study on the concession is presented in a 
detailed way in Section 3. This chapter starts with a description of the initial concession agreement, 
focusing on the contract itself, the bodies celebrating it and responsibilities taken by them (section 
3.1). Special attention will also be given to the causes contributing for the concession delay (section 
3.2) as for the renegotiation process and its implications (section 3.3). In Section 4, a general 
description on the risk accompanying this concession, with special attention to the demand risk 
and risk of fraud will be presented. An analysis on the financial compensations by the State and its 
impact on the initial investment is provided in section 5. Finally, in section 6, conclusions on the 
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overall concession period, further research and recommendation to the future of this concession 
will be also presented.  
2. Literature Review  
  
  Nowadays economic growth heavily lies on the development of infrastructures. The volume of 
infrastructures in a country has both direct and indirect effects, at least, on the long term economic 
growth, (Calderon and Serven, 2003). One way to achieve the optimal infrastructure stock is by 
public and private partnership concessions.  
  The advantages of this well-established form of project execution are somehow considered in the 
present days. From many benefits it may bring, PPPs can reduce development risk, contributes to 
a more cost and time effectiveness in project delivery, provides a better ongoing maintenance and 
requires a small amount of public resources. Unlike in a private project, a high level of ownership 
is maintained by the public sector throughout the project and any outcome after conclusion, 
(NCPPP, 2012).  
  However, what makes a PPPs project valuable are the ways in which this process can improve 
VfM. There are eight different value drivers that increase value for money: Risk transfer, whole of 
life costing, innovation, asset utilization, focus on service delivery, predictability and transparency 
of costs and funding, Mobilization of additional funding and accountability, (World Bank, 2012) 
  In spite of its benefits, there is still no consensus on whether these benefits are enough to outweigh 
the issues brought about by PPPs projects. Several are the cases when few risks taken by the private 
side gives them no incentives for improved management and efficiency. Additionally, models used 
by the public entity to value risk are rather incomplete, being mostly simple and qualitative, 
(Sarmento and Renneboog, 2014).  
  Opportunistic behaviors taken by parties in the concession may also harm the project, ultimately 
bringing it to a renegotiation stage. In many cases, government cut tariffs or holds back on agreed 
tariff increases to maintain the voters support before elections. Also the new elected government 
may not agree with the tariff increase on the concession contract, honored by the previous board. 
The enterprises will, in many cases, behave opportunistically trying to renegotiate the contract in 
an early stage of the concession in order to improve the conditions on the first bid, (Guasch, 
Laffont, Straub, 2003). As a result of that and many other issues, countless contracts around the 
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world have been renegotiated, impacting the creditability of the respective sectors and countries 
as will be seen further in a Portuguese concession.   
  Regardless of the efforts consumed on it, incomplete contract will always persist. Tirole (1999) 
puts in a nutshell the main reasons originating incomplete contracts. First, eventualities that may 
emerge over the running of the concession cannot be anticipated when signing the contract. 
Second, even if capable of anticipating it, the time to review all the possible and infinite 
contingencies would be excessive. Third and last, the contract would be only credible based on 
eventualities that could be verified by a third party, generally a commission with expertise on  
privatization contracts. In the MTS concession, it became evident that this commission was not 
present or in some cases did not perform an acceptable surveillance.  
  There is clearly an incomplete contract in the MTS concession. The allocation of risk made in 
anticipation of the contract was not solid and did not identify the potential risks of demand, fraud 
and others, which not only harmed the Portuguese Government but also the concessionaire MTS. 
Nevertheless, the problem is not the PPPs per si but the way the Portuguese Government negotiated 
MTS and other concessions. A great number of Portuguese concession have seen additional costs 
over the agreed budget mostly due to environmental problems, project changes demanded by the 
Government or delayed urban permits, (Monteiro, 2007). A better balancing of risk ex-ante, as 
their management, will decrease the unilateral modification of the contract by the State in most of 
the Portuguese concessions. The risk of demand shall be allocated to the private party or the 
demand forecast conducted beforehand, must be credible and calculated by unbiased entities and 
not by the concessionaires, as in the case of the MTS concession.  
   A balanced risk-sharing is the main goal to strive when negotiating and running a PPP. However 
this fundamental factor on a concession efficiency is infrequently realized even though most of the 
times the ex-ante analysis of risk-sharing concludes the contrary. On one hand, too little risk on 
the private side will inhibit VfM achievement, on the other hand too much risk will eventually drag 
high risk premiums, pushing VfM down and increasing project costs. Monteiro (2007) claims that 
contracts should be arranged in a way that encourages cooperation between the public and private 
parties, yet preventing strategic behaviors by the private side that may hurt the public sphere.   
  Additionally, the author argues that a solid risk analysis will consider the fact that accepting too 
much risk is almost equivalent as accepting no risk at all. When a partner is not able to manage the 
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risk, its consequents may be transferred to the other party. In some way, MTS concession suffered 
from this issue, when the Government indirectly accepted too much risk demand.  
   The most efficient way to better transfer risk is through risk allocation. Risk allocation is the 
primary process of assignment between the public and private sector. A risk allocation mechanism 
is shared when both sides bear a specific risk outcome, (Bing, Akintoye, Edwards, Hardcastle, 
2005). Karim claims that risk management is the key factor to a credible risk allocation. The author 
also mentions four logical processes of risk allocation which are the identification of risk, 
subsequent analysis of its consequences, solutions to minimize the risk and contingencies 
allocation.  
   The main objective of transferring risk to the private sector is to create an incentive to effectively 
manage and efficiently run the project keeping customers satisfied. Nevertheless, on a value-for-
money basis, the optimal risk distribution will be achieved only if the Government takes back some 
risks, which should be better managed by it, (Loosemore, 2007). Additionally, the author argues 
that this optimal distribution is only achieved if the risk is given to someone who has been made 
aware of the risk, has the greatest capacity to manage it efficiently, has the resources to cope with 
the risk, has the right appetite to want to take the risk and finally, has been given the opportunity 
to charge a proper premium for taking the risk. Once these rules are not met, problem such as 
confused responsibility for monitoring and responding to risk will arise. Also, conflict and disputes 
to drop the risk responsibility when they arise may eventually happen. In summary, the public 
sector is just accepting the illusion of risk transfer since it will be given back in the form of higher 
premiums or project problems.  
 
   Many were the authors who analyzed the optimal risk allocation in concession projects. Grimsey 
and Lewis introduced a model starting by sketching the key risks inherent in a project, followed 
by the analysis of the nature and quantum of each risk from each party’s perspective. For the three 
big players (Procurer, Sponsor, Lender), the authors define their risk perspective, risk variable, risk 
face by them and finishes by identifying the appropriate risk analysis to be used. Quiggin (2006) 
goes more in deep, in analytical terms, and proposes the inclusion of put and call option. Making 
use of these options, in intervals of 5 years, both parties would be able to finish the partnership at 
a specific day with the private entity being given a lump sum of payments based on the valuation 
of the flow of payments and services left under contract.  
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   Medda (2006) presents a final offer arbitration game as a popular increasing model in risk 
allocation. The model based on game theory has the potential to reduce the consequences of moral 
hazard problems in agents’ bids offers. Studies from Li at al (2005) and Jin and Doloi (2008) use 
the frequently adopted survey questionnaires as a risk sharing scheme.  
   In summary, managing risk is a crucial concern in contractual agreements. Risk shall be managed 
both by allocating predictable risk to the party better prepared to take it and through the creation 
of solid and long-term relationship to the joint resolution of uncertain risks. However, reality often 
fails to match the theory. Reforms are the core point to improve risk management and make sure 
PPPs are used only if they bring together VfM and not used as a political convenient way of 
bundling together infrastructure deals.  
   The rest of the paper presents a case study on the Metro Sul do Tejo concession, containing a full 
description on the development of this project over its conception until the present days. The case 
study will give special attention to events that in one way or another contributed for the increase 
of government unexpected expenditures in the concession. It will also provide an elucidated and 
transparent description on the concession’s risk sharing and additional compensations paid by the 
Portuguese, in quantitative terms.  
 
3.  Case study  
3.1         Concession agreement  
3.1.1        Concession Overview  
  
  The project for a southern Tagus surface metro started being considered 20 years before its 
implementation, when the study about the technical and economic viability of a surface metro as 
supplement to the southern Tagus railway network was initiated. The initial proposal was given to 
the central authorities and a contract was signed by the Portuguese Government and the 
municipalities where the works would take place. The proposal predicted an eighty percent of 
capital cost for the Government with the remaining twenty percent as responsibility of the 
municipalities.   
   Yet, the project came to vanish as the Government tried to cut it down. In 1999, a new proposal 
was on the table but this time in a smaller scale. In the same year an international public tender 
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was launched. Through this concessionaire contract, the private unit would be responsible for the 
construction, equipment supply, financing as for the operation and maintenance (DBOT) of the 
Southern Tagus surface metro. Finally, in July 2002 the concession project was given to MTS – 
Metro Transportes do Sul for the period of 30 years until 2032.  
   At the same time, a new agreement was signed between the Government and the municipalities 
of Seixal and Almada. This agreement replaced the 1995 contract, exempting the municipalities 
from any cost contribution, with the Government assuming the public costs in the concession,.   
   The MTS project aims to provide not only an interconnection with transports’ network connected 
to Lisbon but also to allow a more efficient mobility within the covered municipalities. 
Additionally it would help to achieve a modal split favorable to public transport in detriment of 
individual transports, particularly in the cross between the northern and the southern side. In 
general terms, the project was signed with the view of improving the quality of life of the 
population resident in the south bank of Tagus River.  
3.1.2 Concession Contract  
  
  The contract was celebrating between the grantor Portuguese Government and a concessionaire 
MTS, in July 2002. The initial contract follows a DBOFT model covering the project, construction, 
equipment and rolling stock supply, financing, operation and maintenance of the whole light rail 
network of the southern bank of the river. The contract predicted a DBOFT for the development 
of the 1st stage of the surface metro network, in the areas of Almada and Seixal, to be started 
immediately after the contract signing. Nonetheless, the contract also predicted the development 
of a 2nd and 3rd stages of the MTS, to be built in the areas of Seixal and Barreiro in case the 
following requirements were met:  
• Traffic volume in two consecutive years maintained above the minimum level given by the 
reference traffic band1.  
                                               
1 Reference Traffic band refers to the traffic model used in the concession contract to calculate real traffic level against estimated 




• Verification, through and economic and financial studying, that determined traffic volumes 
makes it viable to continue with the 2nd and 3rd stage and consequently testify the reliability 
of such forecasts  
  The 1st stage has a network of 13.5 km comprised by three lines between Corroios and Cacillhas, 
Corroios and Pragal, and Cacilhas and the Univeristy. The potential extension for the 2nd stage 
would be set between Corroios and Fogueteiro and for the 3rd stage an extension to Barreiro.  
  
Source: http://www.mts.pt   
  
  In the contract were also highlighted the construction of the infrastructures of long duration and 
requalification of the surrounding urban areas to be the responsibility of the respective 
municipalities. The works with the infrastructures should be finished until 34 months after the 
signing of the contract, with the services from MTS starting before the end of the 36th month. As 
it will be mentioned in the following sections, this deadline was not met and delays in the 
concession were constant.  
  The concession includes as a secondary element, the use of publicity, commercial areas and car 
parks in the facilities of MTS. 5 sub-contracts and 2 protocols which made part of 27 annexes were 
joined to this initial contract. As containing valuable information in terms of risk sharing and 






3.1.3 Protocols (1999 & 2002)  
 
  On the first of July 1999, an initial protocol was celebrated between the representatives of the 
Government and the Almada, Barreiro, Moita and Seixal Municipalities. The protocol for technical 
and financial cooperation. 
  This protocol set the model for the public tender realization, as well as the supervision and 
management of the concession in the future, clarifying the distribution of responsibilities between 
the Government and the respective municipalities where the metro would be set. Integrated in the 
annex 23 of the concession contract, the protocol enumerated the following points as each party’s 
responsibility:  
Municipalities  
• Maintain and preserve the area reserved for MTS by not taking or accepting any intervention 
that would aggravate its availability afterwards.  
• Implement the planning and management of traffic and car parking which may be necessary to 
ensure the quality of the MTS.  
• Make available the parcels of land of public domain necessary for the concretization of MTS 
network.  
• Prioritize and accept projects that might optimize the concession project viability and provide 
before the start of the metro construction the projects for squares and exterior spaces to be 
crossed by the metro  
Government & Concessionaire  
• In case of public lands but not municipal, the responsibilities lies with the Government  






  The cost of the above projects prioritized and accepted by the municipalities, which were not 
considered as part of proposal of the concessionaire, would be supported by the State through 
community funds in a maximum amount of 7.5% of the investment value in the concession 
infrastructures. A maximum amount of:  
• 1st Stage   ( 9.4 million euros )  
• 2nd Stage ( 2.97 million euros )  
• 3rd Stage ( 4.45 million euros )  
 
  On the 30 of July 2002, a second protocol was signed in conjunction with the concession contract. 
This second protocol between the Government and the municipalities had the goal of conforming 
the project to the works done in exterior spaces, the supervision of these works, building of the 
infra-structures of long duration, make available the lands of public domain and the financial 
contribution incurred by the Government with the works in exterior spaces. This second contract 
was elaborated to reinforce the first protocol in order to accurately identify the rights and duties of 
the Government and MTS concessionaire, in the concession contract.   
  While the initial contract required a contribution by the Government of 9.4 million euros (1st 
stage), in the second one this amount increase to 26 million euros. An increase of almost 300% 
separates these two numbers.2 
  Likewise in the first protocol, a set of points were presented as responsibilities of the Government 
and municipalities:  
Municipalities  
• The municipality must to provide a judgment about the conformity of the ILD project in 
relation to the exterior reparations.  
• The municipality must back the works in the exterior reparations.  
• The municipal lands must be provided to the concessionaire for the construction of platforms, 
metro stops and the reparation of exterior works.   
Under this protocol the Government had the sole responsibility of negotiating with the 
concessionaire the way and conditions for lands acquisition, construction and exploitation of 
                                               
2 Taken from the Tribunal de Contas Report 46/2006 
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parking lots, which were not already being considered by the later. In the following years after the 
protocol’s signing, one can conclude that the focal clause of this second protocol was the one where 
the municipalities make themselves totally responsible for any violation of the clauses stated 
above, in case this violation leads the Government to financially compensate the concessionaire.   
As it will be seen later in the case-study this did not happen in reality. 
 
3.1.4 Concession Financing  
 
Table 1 - Financing of Metro Sul do Tejo3  
  Financing  M.€  %  
                                  
ILD  
State 















Total Public Investment    283  83,7  
Rolling Stock MTS   55 
 
16,2 
Total  338 100 
 
Source: Tribunal de Contas Report  and Author 
  From the table, we conclude that more than 80 % of the funds were borne by public investments. 
All the public funding was allocated to infrastructures of long duration, with the Portuguese state 
contributing with roughly 68% of the total public investment. The concessionaire contributed with 
slightly more than 15% of the total funds, being allocated to rolling stock and ticketing equipment.  
  
  Next section presents a diagram of the different bodies involved in the Initial Contract and the 
subsequent years for better understanding the concession´s course of events that came to be seen 
later. Additionally, information about the bodies that were created for this project and the 
agreements between them are briefly described.  
                                               
3 Taken from the Tribunal de Contas Report 46/2006 




3.1.5 Concession Diagram  
  
  Apart from the grantor, the Portuguese Government and the concessionaire, this project has been 
marked by a great involvement of different bodies that with their different objectives influenced 
the course of events in the concession.  
  
Exhibit 1 - MTS concession structure  
The below figure shows the structure of the MTS Concession. Presenting the agreements that created the construction of Metro 
Sul do Tejo and the bodies that celebrated them.  
 
 
Source 2 : made by the author 
 
  The above diagram presents the different bodies involved in the concession at the time of the 
initial contract or later in the construction stage. GMST was the representative of the Portuguese 
Government, which had as main goals the coordination and supervision of the principal objectives 
in the concession contract. This body would cease its activities in the end of the construction phase 
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in the 1st stage of the MTS network. Moura Consultores, Siemens and ACE were outsourcing firms 
used by MTS for consulting, supplying and construction services respectively.  
  The next sub-chapter presents the main responsibilities of the Portuguese Government in the 
concession contract  
3.1.6 Responsibilities of the Government  
  
  Although the present concession lies on a public and private partnership model, many are the 
responsibilities on the side of the grantor, Portuguese Government. Two different financial 
responsibilities can be found:  
  
• Costs incurred with the infra-structures of long duration as any activity necessary for the 
beginning of the operating phase with exception of the ticketing equipment and rolling stock.  
  
• Implicit costs incurred with the assumed risks matrix , in particularly with the demand risk, 
through two different channels:  
1. The Government must financially compensate the concessionaire when the traffic goes 
below the lower limit of the reference traffic band5, based on the formula presented on 
the concession contract.  
  
2. The concessionaire is allowed to ask for the redemption of the concession if during the 
first three years after the begging of MTS service, the traffic stays below the minimum 





                                               




3.2 Background on the Renegotiation  
  
  As stated in the concession contract, the MTS service should begin no later than the 36 month 
after the signing day of the contract. However, roughly 2 years after the signing day, the concession 
was already close to renegotiated. A situation partly caused by the Municipality of Almada, as this 
party refused to provide the municipal lands that ultimately prevented the MTS to start operation 
on the agreed dates.  
  As stated by the Portuguese court of audits in its 2006 audit report, the arguments presented by 
the municipality of Almada for the supposed delay of the works are mere factual description of the 
events. The CMA added as one of the causes, the inappropriate manner of organization from the 
concessionaire, which run the concession anarchically contradicting the concession contract and 
the impositions stated in the DIA6 
3.2.1 Municipality Deliberation  
  
  The municipality presented several conditions to be met, which were not stipulated in the contract, 
in order to provide the necessary lands for the continuation of the works. These conditions were:  
• The Municipality demanded that the construction process followed an evolutionary system, 
called “Trem Construtivo”7, as agreed on the concession contract.   
• The concessionaire and its related parties should strictly comply with the safety 
requirements stated in the SIGAQS of the concessionaire and in the DIA.   
• Technical and logistic conditions should be provided to the GMST so that it can supervise 
and conduct the project on behalf of the State.  
• A decision should be taken on where to locate the terminal of Cacilhas. It is important to 
highlight that this subject was not mentioned in the concession contract.  
• A new route for the “triangulo da ramalha”8 cross and Street Conceição Sameiro Antunes 
should be set.  
                                               
6 Declaration of environmental impact 
7 This model was based on the scheduling of the work by MTS, where the works are conducted lot by lot and section by section in order to minimize 
the impact of the works on the urban environment. 
8 Triangle of three lines of MTS surrounding a block of buildings 
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• The municipality demanded the construction of car parks.    
• Compensation ought to be given to merchants due to damages caused by the works.  
• The project should adopt the measures exiting in the mobility plan ”Acessibilidades 21”9 
  
  The fact that the Municipality of Almada demanded several conditions, which were not 
mentioned in any of the two protocols celebrated between the Government and the municipalities 
ended up being one of main causes for the delay of the works for more than 2 years.  
  As stated in the protocol of technical and financial cooperation between the Government and the 
municipalities, the later ought to provide the lands necessary to the works with the condition that 
the concessionaire had given the partial plans for the works at least 30 days in advance. This 
condition was, in fact, met by the concessionaire.  
3.2.3 GMST Briefing Note  
  
  As a representative of the Portuguese Government, GMST sent on the 18th of March 2004, an 
information note to the secretary of state for transports with its own analysis on the above 
conditions. The note presented the following conclusions:  
• In contrast with what was presented by the municipality of Almada, the works which would 
follow a “Trem construtivo” model only started during the month of March. Until the present 
time, only related works were conducted, which were not supposed to follow the mentioned 
model, as stated in the concession contract.  
• All the standard and rules are being followed regarding the safety requirements, the SIGAQS 
and the DIA. Monthly reports are sent to the municipality in what concerns the compliance of 
the works with the safety requirement and the activities in the SIGAQS.  
  Nevertheless, the GMST assumed its lack of resources for monitoring and controlling these 
systems. GMST presented the impossibility of contracting an outsourcing team of auditors as an 
additional issue for the defective monitoring. As already stated, this situation cause by the 
Municipality ceased the conclusion of MTS’s infra-structures. However, although this deliberation 
                                               
9 Plan with the purpose of presenting solutions for a better circulation in the city of Almada, giving privilege to public transports  
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ceased the works, the long renegotiation process which would be finalized in 2008 was directly or 
indirectly caused by several different factors. A brief description of each of them will be given in 
the next subsection  
 
3.2.4 Causes for the Concession Delay  
3.2.4.1 Political Changes  
 
  The first years of the concession coincided with three different Portuguese Governments. On the 
22 of July 2002, the contract was signed by the current representative of the State at the time. On 
the 17 of July 2004 the XVI Government was elected and secretaries of state were assigned to 
existing portfolios. On the 12 of March 2005 the third and the XVII Government was elected. 
Overall, 8 ministers and 3 secretaries of state were in charge of a project with less than 4 years of 
life. In a nutshell, the successive alterations of government and its representatives brought a lack 
of central decision at a time where negotiations were on the spotlight.  
  3.2.4.2 Commissions  
  
  With the cessation of the works, the concessionaire asked for the renegotiation of the contract. To 
this end, in 2004 a monitoring commission was created in order to help on alterations of the 
contract conditions. On the 8 of March 2006, a new and second commission was nominated with 
the goal of expediting the work attributed to its former. This shows the inertia presented by the 
first commission, since over its 15 months of life it was not able to find any solution to the pending 
issues. On the 22nd of March, commission and concessionaire agreed on a deadline of 90 days for 
the termination of the renegotiation process. This deadline was, by far, not met.  
3.2.4.3 Municipality of Almada  
  
   As mentioned in the previous section, the Municipality of Almada decided to make the lands 
available for the continuation of the works if several conditions were met. Some of these conditions 





A. Terminal of Cacilhas  
  There was a deadlock on where to locate the Terminal of Cacilhas. The terminal, being part of 
lot 1, was not included in the section 1 of MTS in the concession contract. However, as stated by 
the court of auditors in its 2006 report, it is not understandable how the municipality can jeopardize 
all the work on the section 1 due to a decision on a subject that interferes only the lot  
1.10 
B. Triangle of Ramalha 
  According to the draft project, the MTS route would cross the street “Rua do Clube Recreativo”. 
Later, at the time of the initial contract this same route was transferred to the street “Rua Cidade 
de Ostrava”. This new route would form a triangle around a block of buildings by three different 
lines of the metro. However, in the summer of 2003 residents showed their discontent with this 
situation. A new study by the concessionaire brought the idea of the draft project into the table 
again but with improvements. The municipality finally agreed with this solution despite the 
continuing public discontent.  
C. Acessibilidade 21   
  The Municipality of Almada asked for the adaptation of the concession project to the plan of 
Mobility and Accessibility. An agreement was reach between the concessionaire MTS, the 
Municipality and GMST. After a study, by the concessionaire, on the costs and modifications this 
adaptation would bring, it was agreed that the GMST would act as an intermediary and would 
technically support the Municipality.  
D. Route “Conceição Sameiro Antunes”  
  Following the presentation by the concessionaire of a project for the street “Rua Conceição 
Sameiro Antunes and after the technical evaluation with the Municipality, it was concluded that 
this route would bring a large architectural barrier. Subsequently, a new plan was found by the 
                                               
10 The Metro Sul do Tejo network is divided into sections with which one having several lots. Terminal of Cacilhas in lot 1was physically present 
in section 1, however it was not included, in the contract, as such. 
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GMST which eliminated the previous drawback. However, it brought about several modifications 
to initial area under work, increasing costs and work time.  
E. Merchants Compensations   
  The municipality demanded compensations to the local merchants due to trouble brought by the 
works of the project. However, there was a daily supervision by GMST on this subject and all the 
accesses to the commercial shops were granted. Additionally, the concession contract does not 
mentioned any compensation measure for losses caused by the project’s works  
 
3.2.5 Synthesis of the Concession Delay  
  
Exhibit 2 – Synthesis on all the important events caused by work delays from 2002 to 2008  
 
 
Source: made by the author 
  Figure 2 chronologically summarizes the events already described in the previous sections. 
Starting with the municipalities decision of not giving the public lands for the continuation of the 
works to the two commissions created for renegotiation purposes, finishing with the MTS cessation 




• Municipality deliberation  
•   Public land availability dependent on conditions to be met by the parties in the concession .   
March 2004 
  
• GMST briefing note  







  Commission   




• Concessionaire  




• Concessionaire   
• MTS ask for the financial rebalance of the concession due to delay of the MST operation start   
March 2006 
  
• 2.    Commission   




• FRA  
•   Financial Rebalance Agreement and Contract Renegotiation achieved with the help of the commission   
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  In the next section, the relevant modifications on the renegotiation contract as their financial 
implications for the Portuguese Government will be presented  
3.3 Contract Renegotiation  
  
  In February 2006 the concessionaire officially asked for a renegotiation contract after having 
ceased the works with ILD and others. The contract alteration started in December 2004 with the 
participation of the first monitoring commission, GMST and the concessionaire. This contract was 
completely closed only in 2008 with the change of the dates for the beginning of the MTS services 
and the end of the infrastructures construction. It was set that the 1st stage of MTS would be 
concluded in the following way:  
• The line between Corroios and Cova da Piedade to be ready for operation until the 30 of Abril 
2007  
• The line between Corroios and Monte da Caparica University to be ready for operation until 
the 15 of December 2007  
• The other sections to be ready for operation until the 27 of November 2008  
  
Picture 2- The image illustrates the entire 1º stage network of MTS   
  
Source: www.MTS.pt  
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  It is important to highlight that the beginning of MTS service operation was late by three years, 
but the parties did not mention the extension of the concession life in the renegotiation contract. 
This concession would still last for 30 years, as agreed in the initial contract.  
 
3.3.1 Financial Rebalancing Agreement  
  
   A financial rebalance agreement was also celebrated between the Portuguese Government and 
the concessionaire on the 21 of November 2008. This financial rebalancing was a result of the 
delay of the beginning of the MTS operation and the deadline modifications to the ILD conclusion. 
Contribution, mostly, to this delay were the unavailability of public lands necessary for the ILD 
construction and the alteration to the route lines demanded by the CMA, as stressed in previous 
chapters.  
  From this rebalance agreement, the Government directly compensated the concessionaire with an 
amount of 77,5 million euros11. In the following table this compensation amount is break down 
accordingly to what was meant to cover:  
Table 2 – Financial compensation due to delay on the beginning of MTS service  
  
Public Charges  Amount million € 
Compensation from loss revenues  27,036 
Costs with ILC   
Compensations from additional Works  12,874 
Additional costs with dockyards  29,169 
Late interests from contractual works   541,1 
Price update from contractual works   5,676  
Expropriations Alvalade Street  262,3 
Total charges with ILD  48,523 
Co-payments with renegotiation costs  225 
Charges from contract for credit assignment  1.,679 
Total Compensation borne by the State  77,465 
Source: Tribunal de Contas Report 22/2011 and author 
  Table 2 sub-divides compensations into 3 large categories: compensations from loss revenues, 
costs with ILD and cost with the financing and renegotiation processes. A great part from these 
compensations came from cost with ILD, totalizing an amount of 48,523 million. Compensations 
with loss revenues amounted to 27,036 million euros. 
                                               





Exhibit 3 - Detailed distribution of  Financial Compensations  
 
Source: Tribunal de Contas Report 22/2011 and author 
 
  Exhibit 3 shows which financial implications tipped the scale. Clearly the item Loss revenues 
and expenses and the item Yards had a larger weight on the total amount. These items represented 
34 and 37 percent, respectively. Additional works and price updating represent roughly 16 and 7 
percent, respectively, with the rest of the rubrics being of insignificant amount in comparison 
with the total compensation.  
4. Risk sharing  
  
  The main risk inherent in this concession is the demand risk. This risk is borne by the Government 
since it would have to compensate the concessionaire in case the number of passengers per km 
(Pkt) stays below the lower limit of the traffic reference band. The concession contract establishes 
that the concessionaire bears all the risks accruing from the operation of the MTS service. This 
includes the operational costs associated with the operation of the railway network, maintenance 
of the equipment, rolling stock and installations.  
  The risk of fraud is both shared by the Government and the MTS concessionaire. This risk 
includes the lack of ability by the concessionaire to force every passenger to pay for the service.  
In other words, customers who illegally use the service without paying for it and other situations 
that shall be explained, in more detail, in the next sub-chapter.  
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  The concessionaire also bears the risk incurring from the advertisement low revenue levels. Due 
to the current financial crisis, the revenue coming from advertisement dropped, making it an 
uncontrollable risk for the concessionaire.  
  
Table 3 – Risk Allocation in the MTS Concession  





ILD project  Construction  MTS  
ILD works, including price updating  Construction  MTS  
Material supply  Construction  MTS  
Expropriation  Expropriation  MTS  
Public land availability  Expropriations  Government  
Unilateral changes  Operation  Government  
Demand  Traffic  Operation  Government  
Fraud  Operation  Shared  
Force Majeure  Archaeological finds  Construction  Government  
Natural catastrophes  Construction/Operation  Government  
Wars  Project/Construction/Operation  Government  
Modernization  Modification or outdated technology  Operation  Shared  
Availability  Supply disruption  Operation  MTS  
Source: made by the author 
  Table 3 shows the allocation of risk between the Portuguese Government and the concessionaire 
MTS over the life of the project. The risks of traffic and fraud highlighted in the table are the most 
relevant over the concession period, and will deserve further attention later in this study. The main 
risks present in MTS concession and which deserve further explanation are:  
Project & Construction  
  The realization and execution of the project is from the MTS responsibility. Exception may result, 
in case of unilateral modification by the Portuguese Government. Although not mentioned, the 
operating and maintenance risks were also allocated to the concessionaire.  
Demand Risk  
  The risk Demand is ultimately allocated to the Portuguese Government since demand values are 




Availability risk  
  Concerning the availability risk, the concessionaire is the complete responsible for any 
unavailability of MTS service. In case the unavailability threshold is not met, the concessionaire 
is bond to specific penalties.   
  
Force majeure risk  
  The force majeure risk, of the Government’s responsibility, represents any unpredictable event, 
which, directly or indirectly, has a negative impact in the concessionaire’s contractual obligations 
or in the concession project.  
Modernization Risk  
  Although officially allocated to the concessionaire, any time a technological modification largely 
affecting the financial equilibrium of the concession, will the Portuguese Government equally 
contribute for such expenses.  
4.2 Risk of Fraud  
  
  The risk of fraud came to be of great importance after the beginning of the metro service. This 
risk results from the fact that passengers who own a monthly card but do not validate them; 
passengers who bought a ticket but do not validate it or passengers who do not buy a ticket at all. 
Therefore one would conclude that the concession has borne this risk, as it directly gives a loss in 
revenues. However, as mentioned by the IMTT12, over the years it has been the Portuguese state 
that has actually borne the risk of fraud.  
  The risk of fraud was set 8% 13  in the concession contract. Yet, the formula for financial 
compensations, in case of traffic deficit, did not take into account this number. This discrepancy 
between the clause in the contract and the financial model means that a fraud increase indirectly 
harms the Portuguese Government. The concessionaire is compensated taking into account the 
difference between the estimated traffic in the base case and real traffic determined by the control 
                                               
12 Mobility and Transports Institute, I.P 
13 Percentage of passengers travelling in a fraudulent way 
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mechanisms. Recently, the Concessionaire arrived a rate of 25% for passengers travelling in a 
fraudulent way which is much higher than the 8 % estimated in the contract. 
 
 4.1.2 Demand Risk  
  The Portuguese Government bears the majority of the risk in the concession, that is, the demand 
risk. The years, in which the numbers of passengers stay below the lower limit of the reference 
traffic band, the Government has to financially compensate the concessionaire.  
Table 4 – Calculation method for Financial Compensations   
Real vs Estimate Demand  Calculation Formula  
PK>PK1>PK2  ATBn x (PKn - PK1n) x0,15 + (PKn - PK2n)x0,1  
PK1>PK>PK2  ATBn x (PK1n – PK2n) x 0,1  





First 3 years of MTS operation  
The concessionaire can ask for the concession 
redemption and be given a compensation as following:  
• Loans becomes responsibility of the operator  
• Sum of the following:  
• Payment of the shareholders capital at a rate 
equal to Euribor    (6 months)  
• Sum of the cash-flows discounted at the 
Euribor Rate until the 15 year of the 
concession  
  
Source: made by the author 
ATBn – Average tariff band in year n  
PK- Real traffic (passengers/Km) in year n  
PK1n-Upper limit of the upper band  
PK2n-Lower limit of the upper band  
PK3n-Lower Limit of the reference band  
PK4n-Lower Limit of the lower band  
  
  On the other hand, if the traffic of passengers stays in or above the upper traffic band, the 
concessionaire must give to the grantor a financial contribution in accordance to the formula 
presented in the table 4. The project was considered to be self-sustainable according to the 
31 
 
estimated demand values and the limits of the reference band. However, it is important to highlight 
that it was the responsibility of the concessionaire to arrive at these calculations, putting into 
question their reliability.  
  
  This traffic study was too optimistic ultimately making the compensation from traffic deficit the 
third largest one in the concession. After two years of MTS operation, traffic demand never 
achieved the lower limit of the reference band. The following table presents the traffic as in the 
base case until 2015 and the real or estimated traffic conducted by the concessionaire.  
  
Years  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
LLRTB 14 16,139.445  88,064.228  88,228.363  89,681.649  89,138.089  89,597.709  90,060.537  90,526.60  
Real/Estimated  
traffic  
1,889.278  24,725.862  29,329.763  32,261.410  _  _  _  _  
Source: Courts of audits (2011) and Concession Contract (Annex 4) 
  The real traffic in 2009 and 2010 and the estimated one in 2011 are 28.1%, 33.2% and 36, 4%, 
respectively, of the traffic in the lower limit of the reference band. By the year of 2011 the State 
had already paid 23.14 million euros to the concessionaire as financial compensations due to traffic 
deficit, making it an average of 7 million euros per year since the beginning of the metro operation 
in 2008  
  The data available help us to conclude that in the near future this trend will continue and the 
grantor will keep on paying financial compensations to the concessionaire (Tribunal de Contas, 
2011). Most of the financial flows coming from the rail sector concerns compensations with the 
MTS concession, (Quarterly bulletin UTAP15, 2013). The first quarter of 2004 saw an increase of 
17%, compared to the previous year, to 2.3 million euros from the financial compensations for 
reduced traffic. 
4.1.3 Summary on Risk Allocation 
  Initially, forecasted demand was presented in the original contract. However, several events that 
may emerge over the course of the concession cannot be anticipated when signing the contract. 
Second, even if capable of anticipating it, the time to review all the possible and infinite 
                                               
14  Lower limit of reference traffic band 
15 Technical unit of Project Monitoring 
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contingencies would be excessive. Additionally, the contract would be only credible based on 
events that could be verified by a third party, generally a body with expertise on privatization 
contracts, (Tirole, 1999). In the MTS concession this body was not present to analyze and provide 
insights, particularly, on these forecasts. We should also highlight that a commission was later 
created to follow up on the changes to the initial contract but was not always efficient in its task, 
section (3.2.4.2).  
  Demand risk can be allocated to each party or shared by both (OECD, 2008). Additionally, 
allocating risk to the party best able to manage it is one of the key factors to an optimal risk sharing, 
(Nur Alkaf, 2008). In MTS concession, the demand risk was allocated to one party but not to the 
one best able to manage it.  
  In urban road projects, the Government is able to manage demand risk, (Quiggin, 2006). Demand 
is conditioned by provision of public transport and urban development policies. In case of public 
services such as schools and health care facilities, the government again, can have a great influence 
on its demand as it can increase, for example, the years of schooling, (Quiggin, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the MTS concession does not fall in any of these situations, and then we would 
conclude that demand risk borne by the Government is not as acceptable as in the rest of the 
literature. 
  On the other hand, totally transferring it to the MTS concessionaire would eventually push the 
company into bankruptcy since it has been under financial trouble over the last years. Also, too 
much risk on one side would lead to higher risk premiums. 
  This concession project should have taken into consideration the experience with the Fertagus 
concession, particularly in what concerns the Demand risk. This concession suffered from wrong 
demand forecasts from 1990 through 2005.Renegotiation brought new forecasts much lower than 
the previous ones, taking into consideration assumptions directly related to the reality exiting at 
the time and in the near future, (Sarmento, 2012).16 
   
 
                                               
16 Assumptions such as the extension of the service to Setubal, a new public transport (MTS), reformulation of 
Transtejo offer with return to the terminal in Terreiro do Paco and connection the Lisbon Metro. 
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Had the parties in the MTS concession used this earlier experience and adopted a shared allocation 
of risk, not based on the actual reference traffic band, then the Portuguese Government could be 
free of any financial compensation to the concessionaire. Giving support to this ending is the 
deliberation of the Portuguese Government of any financial compensation from traffic deficit after 
2010 in the Fertagus concession. 
 
5.  Additional public costs  
  The concession MTS had an initial cost of 284 million for the Portuguese state. Nevertheless, in 
2011 this amount had gone up by 101 million euros, representing an increase of approximately 
35%.  
  
Table 5 – Additional cost for the Government with MTS  
Additional Costs  Amount Million € 
Initial public investment  283,683 
Additional costs with the project   
Financial rebalancing agreement  77,465 
Compensation payments  23,141 
Total of additional costs  100,606 
Total of public investment  384,290 
   
  As mentioned in the last section (3.3.1) and in table 5, the Portuguese Government paid an amount 
of 77 million euros within the financial rebalancing agreement. The State additionally paid 
compensations of 23 million euros for insufficient demand until 2011. These two costs represented 
20.3% and 6 % of the total public investment.  
  In its annual report on PPPs in Portugal, DGTF forecasted potential compensations for the years 
from 2011 through 2030, coming to an estimation of 12,2 million for 2012 and 7,4 million for the 
subsequent years. Table 6 makes use of the values in table 5 and the values estimated by the 
DGTF17, discounted using a 4% and 8% annual interest rate so that it can be compared to the initial 
public investment in 2002.  
                                               




Table 6 – Total additional costs & Initial Public investment with MTS 
This table breaks downs the different investment made by the Government in the MTS Concession, differentiating the initial investment from 
subsequent additional costs with its respective percentages on the final investment amount. The Net Present Values in 2002 of the additional costs 
to the Government in the MTS Concession based on 2 distinct discount rates. The different investments made by the Government in the MTS 
Concession, differentiating the initial investment from subsequent additional costs with its respective percentages on the final investment amount.  
Cost with MTS  Amount18  4%  %Initial  % Total  8%  %Initial  % Total  
Costs with Renegotiation 77,4 M 61,2M 21,5 % 14,3 % 48,8 M 17,2 % 12,7 % 
Costs insufficient traffic ( 2011) 23,1 M 14,5M 5,1 % 
 
3,3 % 12,5 M 4,4 % 3,2 % 
Costs insufficient traffic (2030) 158,8 M 70,8 M 24,9 % 16,4 % 36,7 M 12,9 % 9,6% 
Total Additional Costs 259,4 M 146,5  M 51,6 % 34,1 % 98,1 M 34,6 % 25,7 % 
Initial Public investment 283,6 M 283,6  M - 65,9 % 283,6  M - 74,3% 
Total Public Investment 543 M 430,1 - 100% 381,7 M - 100% 
Source: made by the author and Court of Audits 
  When discounting the additional costs with the MTS project at a 4% interest rate, the Government 
spent 51.6 % of the initial investment in compensations to the MTS. Considering higher rates in 
the market and hence using an 8 % discount rate, the Government would be still asked to pay 25.7 
% of the initial investment in compensations.   
   It is important to highlight that forecasted compensations were conducted in 2011 by the DGTF 
for traffic deficit until 2030. Nevertheless, other studies have been done with higher results for 
these compensations. Therefore, if the later were used, the percentage values for additional 
compensations mentioned above would have been even higher.  
  Going back to 2002 and analyzing the protocol agreement between the Portuguese Government 
and the municipalities, one could verify the increase of 300 % in the Government contribution for 
the works with MTS compared to the previous protocol. This example shows us how strategically 




                                               
18 Values in Million Euros 
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6.  Conclusions  
  
   Portugal experienced a large wave of Public and Private Partnerships over the last two decades. 
The low growth presented in most of this period was mostly originated by a low level in education, 
productivity and a lack of needed infrastructures. The acceptance of the European common 
currency urged the country to rapidly work on these problems. As mention in the first chapter of 
this study, one of the justifications for the use of PPP Concessions is the fiscal or debit constraints 
faced by a national government. As Portugal integrated the European Union over the last 20 years, 
several limits on major economic indicators were imposed on the Euro members. Therefore, the 
perfect tailpipe for the Portuguese Government was to follow the public and private partnership 
trend in order to modernize itself.  
   Nevertheless, the successive Portuguese Governments overused this Concession process, using 
it in sectors which did not need it at the time or using it in a precarious way in terms of efficiency. 
The highways built across the country with, the goal of connecting the several districts, is a good 
example of a project which its relevance was not entirely certain. This project was accomplished 
through a public and private partnership and as we see today, the traffic in them has not been 
enough to justify their construction.  
  The risk shared by the Portuguese Government and MTS is present on section 4. When looking 
at current risk framework of railway concessions in Portugal (DGTF, 2011), we see three of them 
being the most problematic ones in the MTS concession. Project/Construction risk and force 
majeure risk were predominant in this concession, since events such as the unavailability of public 
lands, alterations of the metro’s routes and related works caused the concessionaire not to fulfill 
its contractual obligation and the Government to financially compensate the company.  
  The demand risk is the third and the most crucial risk in this concession and has been under the 
Government responsibility since the first day of the MTS service. Although the supposed revenue 
accruing to the Concessionaire should come from traffic flows, until the present day, most of it has 
been dependent on direct financial compensation from traffic deficit. Taking as true the forecasted 
financial compensations (section 5), this dependency will persist and the risk allocation in the 
concession will continue unbalanced.  
  One could exert that it was concessionaire that conducted the traffic forecasts in which the base 
case model in the concession contract was built. This raises questions of creditability in these same 
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forecasts. However, as stated by public authorities, these forecasts are based on assumptions that 
may not be realized in the future, and then possible mistakes should be devalued.   
  Therefore, the fault would be attributed to the Portuguese Government (section 2), as mentioned 
by S. Monteiro. Late 2010, the MTS was close to stop operation due to concessionaires’ lack of 
financial capacity. This cessation of the service was dependent on compensations by government 
from traffic deficits. This ultimately helps us to understand and agree with the idea of government’s 
fault on this concession failure, as the concessionaires came out hurt as well.   
  Table 6 (Section 5) presents the impact of additional compensations due to delays in the 
concession and traffic deficits. Using a 4% interest rate yields discounted compensations of more 
than 50% of the total initial investment. Total compensations represent 34 % when looking at the 
total investment until the present day. These numbers are still significant when using an 8% interest 
rate. In fact, when separating the compensations both due to renegotiations and traffic deficits, the 
later represents more than 50% of them.   
  This tells us that great part of the costs with the concession come from the bad allocation of risk, 
especially demand risk, and not from concession delays and subsequent renegotiation.  
6.1 Recommendations and Further Research   
  
  Taking into account the several conclusions and ideas taken from the case study, several 
recommendation can be made for the parties involved. Firstly, a more rigorous way of analysis of 
demand forecast studies and the economic viability of the current concession. The State should 
introduce better mechanism of traffic control to lower the impact of fraud. It is vital for the State 
to fully provide the technical and human resources to the public authorities and commissions which 
monitored and controlled this concession. Finally, the Portuguese state should avoid project which 
effectively transfer Demand risk to the public side.  
  This case study presents the Government’s bad preparation in the concession contract as its lack 
of decision power during the construction process. All of this leading to a wrong allocation and 
management of risk and renegotiation. Further studies can be built on the reason for the lack of 
action by the several public authorities and commissions during the construction stage and possible 
solutions and buffers for wrong traffic forecast that most impact this project. A study on the private 
partner, understanding the development of results for the concessionaire throughout the concession 
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period or ways to deal with the risk of fraud could be of immense value and a great extension to 
the work already done. These, together, would not only help to better understand what went wrong 
with the MTS concession but would give lessons for future or past related concessions.  
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